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UPDATE ON THE IMF-WORLD B A M JOINT ANNUAL MEETING 
I am happy to say that ay memoranda of September 8, I98O 
and September 12, 1980, on the IMF and the World Bank? respectively, 
were quite accurate in anticipating the major issues that were raised 
in the September 28 - October 3 Joint annual .meetings of the IMF and 
kf 
IBRD.- However3 since it was impossible to perfectly anticipate all 
aspects of the meetings, I would first like to update and correct 
the original material, where appropriate. I will then follow with 
some general observations. 
The Specific Issues 
(a) The PLO 
At the time of writing the memoranda5 it appeared that the Governors' 
vote on observer status for the PLO would not reach a quorum, thereby 
allowing the Chairman of the meetings, Mr. Amir Jamai of Tanzania, 
to decide upon the issue. He, of course, has always been in favor 
t 
of inviting the PLO to the meetings. At the prospect of having the PLO 
attend the meetings, powerful members of the U.S. Congress put great 
pressure on the Carter Administration to ensure a quorum and a negative 
vote on the observer status. The Congress threatened that should the 
PLO be permitted to attend, it would then refuse to pass pending 
legislation for U.S. subscriptions related to a capital increase at 
the World Bank and a quota increase at the IMF. 
The Administration panicked and then began to put great pressure 
on the Governors to support a negative vote. A quorum was reached 
in time and. the PLO observer status was rejected. This threatened to 
throw the meetings into turmoil; the negative vote won by a very 
slim margins reportedly because some PLO supporters misunderstood 
the ballots, thereby accidentally voting on the anti-PLO platform. 
kj This report represents a follow-up on the material already 
presented in the two aforementioned memoranda and therefore 
hp -̂ pad onlv in conjunction with them. (See CEPAL/WAS /R.18 & R.19) 
Sane Arab countries threatened to make a floor fight at the 
meetings, and, of course, their financial support of the Bank 
and Fund became even more problematical. 
At the last minute a compromise was reached. It was decided to 
have no observers attend the meetings this year. Meanwhile, all 
debate on the PLO issue was held behind closed doors in the meetings 
of the Procedures Committee. Out of this grew an agreement to form 
a new committee of finance ministers to study the matter and report 
back by the end of the year. The new committee is to have 7 instead 
of 6 members and will be headed by Mr. R. Muldoon of New Zealand. 
Importantly, neither the U.S. or Saudi Arabia will be on the 
committee. 
(b) A food facility 
In the memoranda I did not anticipate a proposal for a Food 
Facility at the IMF. The idea apparently originated at the FAO and 
has had an enthusiastic reception from the Managing Director of the 
Fund. It would help to compensate countries for shortfalls in 
domestic food-production and sharply higher prices for food imports. 
While details for a facility must still be worked out, such a program 
would no doubt assist the Fund in its efforts to soften its image 
vis-a-vis the Third World; the concept also represents a positive 
response to some proposals made by the G-2b. It should be noted 
that a number of industrialized countries object to formation of 
a new facility, as such, and urge that the program be put into the 
already operating Compensatory Finance Facility. 
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(c) The SDR 
There was almost unanimous support for a more important role 
for the SDR. The view was very positive on the decision to simplify 
the SDR currency basket to five currencies (U.S. dollar, Deutsche Mark, 
French franc, the Japanese yen, and the pound sterling). Most 
countries seem to want measures to create an even more attractive 
SDR, e.g. by giving it a commercial interest rate, by promoting its 
use in the private sector, etc. There also seems to be a general 
feeling that another round of SDR allocations is merited in the 
fourth basic period beginning in 1 9 8 2 , largely because when the 
allocations for the third basic period were planned in 1978» there 
were no perceptions of the current economic difficulties. Just how 
much should be allocated in the fourth basic period is a matter of 
debate, with the developing countries probably pushing for larger 
allocations than many industrialized countries might want to see. 
(The G-2k proposed a 6 billion supplementary allocation during this 
basic period and has mentioned the figure of 10 billion SDRs for 
the beginning of the fourth basic period in 1982). As a side note, 
one of the few dissenting views on the role of the SDR came from 
Greece, which proposed the creation of a "more effective" reserve 
asset which it has designed and termed the "metron". 
(d.) The SDR Link 
This proposal may be slowly coming of age. There seems to be 
renewed support for a link and indeed the Interim Committee has 
asked the Executive Director of the Fund to carry out a "comprehensive" 
study of a possible link. A major obstacle to overcome in establishing 
the link is the continued opposition of the U.S., which was publicly 
expressed in the meetings by Treasury Secretary Miller» The U»S. 
feels that a link will under/nine the SDR as a reserve asset. 
(e) More resources for the Fund and Bank 
There was strong support in most circles for increased resources 
for the Fund and World Bank. 
In order to support lending up to 600$ of quotas -which was 
formally endorsed- the IMF has been authorized to seek new resources. 
There is a general preference among the industrialized countries 
that increases come via quotas, and for this purpose the Fund was 
given a mandate to prepare for the Eighth General Review of Quotas, 
even though subscriptions under the Seventh Review have yet to be 
fulfilled. However, recognizing the Fund's immediate need for 
resources, it received continued support to borrow abroad. The 
preferred source of funding would be direct loans from OPEC, both 
because of principle and. the fact that it probably would prove to be 
more economical than securing resources in private markets. However, 
private markets may be the only recourse if the PLO issue is not 
resolved. If private markets are used, then it must be determined 
whether borrowing will be direct, or through the international 
commercial banks, which of course would be eager to lend to the Fund. 
It is important to note that borrowing from private markets has some 
legal roadblocks which the IMF would first have to overcome. 
Robert McKamara dramatically pointed out the Bank's need for 
new resources. Among the arguments given were: (i) the 1981-1985 
lending program increase of a year in real terms was designed in 
1977 and could not anticipate the surge in inflation and new financing 
requirements of LDCs, (ii) the new structural financing loans must 
now come from current resources while they should be additional to 
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existing loans, (iii) the Bank now set.s a need for it to roughly-
double its lending in energy and (iv) the admission of China to the 
Bank will place large new demands on the Bank that will have to 
reduce the availability of loans to other countries, unless new 
resources are made available to it» There seemed to be broad 
consensus for supporting more Bank lending, particularly in the 
areas of energy and structural adjustment. It remains to be seen 
just how this will be done. The Brandt Commission's idea of changing 
the gearing ratio of the Bank to 2s 1 received much consideration and 
indeed it was even suggested by Mr. McNamara as a possible way to 
increase the Bank's resources. Other ways suggested by Mr. McNamara 
were creation of an energy affiliate (which would not necessarily 
have to have a Is 1 gearing ratio) and an increase in callable, but 
not paid-in capital of the Bank. A number of industrialized countries 
seemed to be inclined towards the more conservative route of increasing 
callable capital, so as not to erode the Bank's creditworthiness, 
while many developing countries argued for a change in the gearing 
ratio. Still other countries suggested a combination of all the 
possibilities. 
(f) Subsidy Account 
There will be subsidies for IMF lending which probably will be 
financed by a combination of voluntary contributions and repayments 
from the Trust Fund. The effective liquidation of the Trust Fund 
was opposed, by the G-2^, which sought to have 3t maintained for 
exclusive lending to low income IDCs. The G-2^ wants the subsidy 
account to be additional to existing Fund resources, but under the 
proposal to draw resources from the Trust Fund this would not be 
the case. 
(g) Voting Rights 
The G-2k wants increased voting rights for developing countries. 
With regard to the IMF, it wants LDCs' position in the quotas to 
rise from 33$ to which would enhance their decision making power; 
in the upcoming 8th Review of Quotas they would like to see such a 
quota realignment undertaken (Saudi Arabia has been very vocal on 
this issue). The IMF's Interim Committee, interestingly, has urged 
the Executive Board to give further consideration to the matter. 
The issue of voting rights probably will be a major matter of debate 
with regard to the proposed energy affiliate at the World Bank; if 
the OPEC countries are the main source of funds, they will undoubtedly 
seek a bigger voice in the Bank and/or the affiliate. Of course 
there are some who question whether the energy affiliate should be 
controlled by oil producers. 
(h) IMF/World Bank Cooperation 
There was general recognition that the two institutions will 
have to collaborate more closely in the future. The U.S. even 
suggested a formal review of past collaborative efforts in order 
to arrive at concrete guidelines for future joint operations. 
(i) Substitution Account 
There seemed to be renewed interest in the substitution account, 
and the Interim Committee recommended further study of the matter. 
Importantly, the U.S. appears willing to reconsider the concept, 
although it would prefer to use the term "monetary reserve account". 
On the other hand, the U.S. publicly stated that it sees little 
possibility for rapid adoption of any measures in this area. 
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( j) Surveillance 
Many developing countries, and some industrialized countries, 
urged the Fund to intensify and make more explicit its surveillance 
of surplus, as well as deficit countries, in order to ensure more 
symmetry in the adjustment process. The whole concept of Fund 
surveillance remains vaguely defined and some countries (including 
the U.S.) suggested a more explicit and systematic process. It is 
notable that in the meetings Germany publicly stated that it could 
live with its current account deficit for awhile, suggesting that 
it might be under pressure from the IMF not to quickly return to a 
surplus position. 
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Some General Observations 
In contrast to the U.N. General Assembly, the tone of the 
Joint Meetings was low-key and not very conflictive. The developing 
countries did not place any major new demands on the industrialized, 
countries. With respect to past demands, in terms of concrete 
action the only event of major significance was the increase in 
loans available frcm the Fund, up to 600$ of quota. • 
Despite the above, one does gain a sense of progress, no matter 
how slow that may be. In essence, many of the proposals of the 
G-2hs as reflected in its Program for Immediate Action, appear to 
be gaining support and/or serious consideration. The IBRD has called 
for a substantial increase in resources to promote energy development 
and to make its structural lending more significant and additional 
to current resources; there probably will be more SDR allocations 
and the possibility of a "link" at least now appears to be 
less remote; the Fund, is on the verge of aiding countries suffering 
from shortfalls in food production and/or food price increases 
-which is rather uncustomary terrain for the IMF-; the issue of 
increasing LDC voting power has become respectable; the Fund 
has significantly increased the resources available to anyone 
borrower for adjustment, while extending the adjustment period itself , 
as well as the repayment period; and the Fund has recently 
recognized that its conditionality should, be modified to take into 
account the current world circumstances. So, many of the G-2b 
proposals have not fallen on deaf ears, and this may be one explanation 
for the rather low-key communique issued by the Group (it is less 
forceful than in the past and has no real new proposals). Thus, 
there is a perception of progress, but one must wonder whether 
it is fast enough to avert a deepening of the crisis in the world 
economy and more sacrifice of the development objectives of the 
Third World. 
There is a sense of frustration in the world community. 
Almost everyone at the meetings expressed deep concern for the 
gloomy world outlook (The Iran-Iraq war had to make everyone feel 
even more vulnerable); yet no one seemed to have any answers on 
how to resolve the problem. The remedial solutions were the tired 
calls (mostly by industrialized countries) for control of inflation, 
"adjustment" (which in the context of the world crisis now means 
different things to differente people) and some ill-defined 
statements about attention to supply matters. Clearly there is a 
need for a total restructuring of thinking on world economic matters, 
yet we are dealing with current problems on the basis of the marginal 
concepts of a by-gone era when energy was cheap and world decision 
making was concentrated, in the hands of a few major industrialized 
countries. New ideas and bold initiatives are clearly lacking. 
Nowhere are the contradictions of the current crisis more 
apparent than in the IMF. It seems to be facing a real identity 
crisis. The Fund still lays emphasis on the need to fight inflation 
and adjustment, yet its orthodox prescription of demand deflation, 
exchange rate devaluation, etc., have become increasingly suspect 
in a world already suffering from very low growth rates and high 
unemployment. Its critics are no longer just the far left, but 
also include many individuals of a much more central persuasion. 
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The Managing Director of the Fund knows that he needs to 
make the IMF more attractive to developing countries if it is to take 
the more active role in world finance that is being urged upon it 
by many industrialized countries and their commercial bankers. 
Thus, the Fund now publicly recognizes that the adjustment process 
can be prolonged, that domestic social objectives should be respected 
and that adjustment should consider the "supply side". However, 
many aspects of this new approach are mentioned only in a second 
breath, and remain ill-defined, making critics take a wait-and-see 
attitude. Meanwhile, as the Managing Director attempts to improve 
its image with the developing countries, he must look over his 
shoulder at those who are inclined toward, the old Fund philosophy, 
and. who openly show their concern about, or opposition to, the new 
liberal tone. The opposition includes not only the old guard in 
the Fund staff, but some important industrialized countries and 
business-financial interests. As examples of the type of opposition 
the Fund encounters, it can be stated that the Governor of Germany 
expressed his continued faith in the need to adjust via demand 
restraint and. he cautioned about moving too fasbin reforms; the 
Governor of England, also expressed the importance of demand managems nt 
in adjustment and noted his concern fbr trends that would convert the 
IMF into an aid organization; and the Financial Times in its 
editorial of September 30 worried that the Fund's new liberal 
approach to conditionality -would be a potentially highly inflationary 
solution to the balance of payments adjustment problems. 
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The World Bank on the other hand, appears to be much better 
placed to cope with the situation. In contrast to the Fund's 
hard-nosed image, the World Bank is the "good guy" and everyone 
has something nice to say about McNamara. The Bank has long been 
involved, in the supply side of the development equation and the 
new focus on structural problems and supply constraints in the 
adjustment process should, not represent uncomfortable terrain for 
the Bank. Indeed, even the new Structural Adjustment Facility is 
just an outgrowth of its earlier "program lending", so the 
question here is not so much how to lend for structural adjustment, 
but rather where the additional resources can be secured. And. the 
additional resources are crucial to having the Bank make a significant 
impact on current financing of balance of payments deficits; their 
project loans encounter enormous delays in disbursement and. the 
amount of rapidly disbursable resources now available for structural 
adjustment is rather small, representing only about 800 million 
dollars this yearo 
Even assuming the Bank and Fund substantially increase their 
resource base, it is clear that for Latin America in the immediate 
future the two institutions will remain only catalysts for other 
resources that will be derived basically from commercial banks. 
The commercial banks will continue to mobilize most of resources 
for developing countries on the short, medium and long term 
spectrums, with their confidence presumably being boosted by a 
somewhat greater profile for the Bretton Woods Twins. The real 
question -if the international economic picture remains gloomy-
is just how much lending from the Twins is needed to maintain the 
confidence of the commercial banks, and assuming that the commercial 
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banks do lend, then, under what terms and conditions will their 
finance be brought forth. Also, one must be concerned about the 
reaction of the commercial banks should a big borrower, e.g., 
Brazil, suffer an open crisis due to the weight of its debt service 
(For an excellent analysis of possible senarios for the 1980s 
-some of them very gloomy- with regard commercial banks' response 
to developing countries deficits, see the September 1980 issue of 
Morgan Guaranty's World Financial Markets). 
During the meetings, the Latin American delegation (via 
speeches of Argentina and. Colombia) expressed its concern about 
protectionism. It also warned against potential regulation of 
international lending; understandably it wants to preserve the 
rather free-wheeling environment of the Eurocurrency market. 
Nevertheless, the industrialized countries seem to strongly favor 
more intense supervision of their commercial banks. 
There were some proposals aired during the meetings concerning 
an international credit insurance affiliate at the World Bank or 
IMF, to guarantee commercial bank loans to developing countries. 
This is not unsimilar to the Brandt Commission proposal for a 
credit insurance program for borrowing in bond markets. Personally 
I am skeptical about insurance sohemas because I think they enmesh 
international institutions too closely in the affairs of private 
commercial and institutional lenders, reducing the plurality in 
the sources of world, finance. I continue to think it is more 
reasonable to adjust legislation so that both the IBRD and Fund 
can better tap directly resources in foreign capital markets, 




(a) The human factor 
I found very little human element in the environment of the 
Meetings Everyone discussed inflation, adjustment, and deficits, 
but there seemed to be little awareness that underlying the issues 
were people, many of whom were in a marginal state of existence in 
developing countries. By attending the Meetings, one realizes how 
"seco" economics, and finance in particular, can be. The outstanding 
exception to this was McNamara's commentary, which argued that growth 
and basic needs are not contradictory objectives, but the very 
essence of development. Anyone interested in economic development 
should read pages 17-28 of his speech; it helps to put current 
problems in a more dramatic and humane perspective. Two other 
eloquent speeches that I think merit attention are the opening 
remarks of Chairman Amal of Tanzania and the presentation of Hugh 
Small of Jamaica; they highlight the frustrations and dilemmas of 
small countries which are seeking to pursue unconventional development 
strategies during a world economic crisis, 
(b ) The Brandt Commission 
The Commission's report was "reborn" in the Joint Meetings. 
Its proposals were constantly being aired and reviewed in favorable 
light in many of the official presentations of developing and 
industrialized countries. An important exception, however, was 
the U.S., which refrained from commenting on the report, 
(c) Controversy 
Aside from the PLO, there were other political issues that 
entered the Meeting. Vietnam complained that the IBRD has reneged 
on its commitments to lend to that country (McTTamara has reportedly 
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been pressured by the U.S. Congress on this mat¿er)| Iran 
claimed that the IMF overlooked the U.S. freeze 5f ^ s assets, in 
violation of its Articles of Agreement; and it iuxo been claimed 
in some circles that many key rules were twisted in order to have 
China quickly admitted to the Fund and Bank. Some also have 
questional OP estimates of China which have made the country an 
IDA client. 
(d) The U.S. position 
President Carter strongly warned that politics should not 
enter the affairs of the Bank and the Fund, in obvious reference 
to the PLO issue. Meanwhile, Secretary Miller gave a speech which 
was one of the most supportive among the industrialized countries 
for the new initiatives at the Bank and Fund. He was, however, 
very much against an SDR link, which represents a serious obstacle 
to any future progress in this area. 
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